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A.  Introduction 
Communication is an element of various economic interactions. Whenever contracts have to 
be settled and agreements have to be made between economic agents, communication plays 
an essential role. That communication is also regarded as an important tool in e-commerce is 
recently demonstrated by eBay Inc.’s acquisition of the Luxembourg-based Skype Technolo-
gies SA, the global Internet communications company. As Meg Whitman, the President and 
Chief Executive Officer of eBay, put it: “Communications is at the heart of ecommerce and 
community.”1 Paying $2.6 billion for a company that uses nothing but downloadable software 
to make phone calls and that gives much of its service away for free seems a bit puzzling, 
however. Does implementing communication facilities for buyers and sellers really help to 
close more deals more quickly as it is argued by eBay? How does communication influence 
the outcome of economic interactions and, in particular, what does economics and manage-
ment science say about the effects of communication? 
That communication has the potential to significantly influence individual behavior was first 
reported by psychologists. Conducting experiments on social dilemma games they observed 
that communication between subjects could significantly increase cooperation rates. For ex-
ample, investigating behavior in an eight-person prisoner’s dilemma game, Dawes, McTavish, 
and Shaklee (1977) found that about 70 percent of subjects chose to cooperate after discussing 
the game face-to-face with their partners, while only 30 percent chose this outcome without 
communication.2 These observations were later confirmed by experimental economists. Isaac, 
McCue, and Plott (1985) implemented face-to-face communication in a public good game 
experiment and observed a significantly positive effect on average cooperation rates. In a sub-
sequent study, Isaac and Walker (1988) did not only replicate this finding, but also reported 
that the initial face-to-face contact between subjects had a long-lasting effect on behavior. To 
find out more about subjects’ preferences for communication, Isaac and Walker (1991) tested 
whether subjects use face-to-face communication even if it is costly. Their results demon-
strated that subjects communicated with each other even if they had to pay for it and they 
used the face-to-face contact successfully, i.e. there was still a significant increase of contri-
butions to the public good.3 The importance of communication for influencing individual be-
havior was particularly pointed out by Sally (1995). In a meta-study involving over 100 expe-
riments on dilemma games he concluded: „A few of the factors that should not affect a partic-
ipant guided by self-interest are, in fact, quite important. Of greatest consequence are the 
communication variables.” (p.78).  
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What are the reasons for the observed cooperation-enhancing effect of communication? In the 
„Handbook of Experimental Economics” Ledyard (1995, p. 158) described the state of the art 
of theoretical and experimental research on this effect as follows: “We see that communica-
tion increases contributions in no-threshold environments with small (N < 15) groups. We do 
not know why. We also do not know what would happen in large groups.” 
This paper reports some recent results of economic research on the communication effect. It 
particularly focuses on the following questions: Which elements of face-to-face communica-
tion are of importance for the communication effect? Is it necessary that subjects see each 
other or is verbal communication enough to significantly influence behavior? How do mass 
media perform compared to face-to-face communication? Can online-media as video-
conferences and email messages substitute direct face-to-face contacts? How do the observa-
tions made in public good games translate to bargaining settings as they are characteristic for 
many online interactions? What role does reputation play for the observed communication 
effects? How do different information structures influence behavior after communication? Is 
one-way communication as effective as two-way communication? Since the answers to these 
questions are based on economic experiments, section B shortly introduces the experimental 
method. Section C overviews the major results and Section D concludes.  
B.  The experimental method 
For a long time, economics has been viewed as a non-experimental science. Although the 
theoretical analysis of economic phenomena had already started in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries with the works of Adam Smith and Augustin Cournot, not until the mid-
twentieth century did economists begin to systematically evaluate their theories under con-
trolled laboratory conditions. Since then, there has been a rapid increase in the number of ex-
perimental studies covering a growing number of topics and research questions in economic 
sciences. With the growing use of the experimental method and with its success in providing 
an important foundation in bridging the gap between theory and observation, experimental 
economics is evolving into a “mainstream” subject in economic research. The award of the 
Nobel memorial prize in economic sciences to the experimental economist Vernon Smith in 
2002 might be regarded as the most explicit sign of this development. 
One of the earliest uses of the experimental method was to test the predictions made by eco-
nomic theories. Traditionally, this task was regarded to be a subject only for econometrics. 
However, since econometricians base their tests on field data, it is often difficult for them to 
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properly control for the conditions under which the theories are generated. Laboratory expe-
riments provide a greater degree of control and, therefore, make it more easy to generate rep-
licable data under the same (ceteris paribus) conditions the theory assumes them to be. As a 
result, the application of experiments has turned out to be an appropriate method to test the 
predictions of various theories in economic sciences.  
Testing theoretical predictions has not remained the only field of application for experimental 
economics. With the observation of regularities that could not be explained by conventional 
economic models, there was the need for further experiments that should generate more data 
in order to adjust existing theories or to develop fully new theories. For example, Allais’s 
(1953) observation that subjects’ behavior is not in line with the predictions made by expected 
utility theory initiated a series of subsequent experiments that were designed to test the ro-
bustness of Allais’s paradoxes. Since the deviations from expected utility theory proved to be 
quite robust, alternative theories that should accommodate the observed violations (e.g., the 
prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, or the regret 
theory by Loomes and Sudgen, 1982, 1987) were offered.  
A third application of experiments is to offer empirically justified advice for policy makers 
and, therefore, to close the gap between economic theories and economic environments in the 
real world. One of the earliest experiments belonging to this strand of research was a study by 
Hong and Plott (1982), which was triggered by a dispute between the US Department of 
Transportation and the railroads on the regulation of the dry bulk commodity transportation 
industry. Recognizing “the potential held by experimental methods for applications and poli-
cy research” (Plott, 2001, p. xv), this experiment was followed by a series of other experi-
ments covering the allocation of airport landing slots (Grether, Isaac, and Plott, 1981, Rassen-
ti, Smith, and Bulfin, 1982), the pricing practices of the Ethyl Corporation (Grether and Plott, 
1984), and the pricing practices in gas transportation networks (Plott, 1988). Since the 1990s, 
this line of research has been greatly extended. It now includes, among others, design features 
in the aerospace industry, in labor markets, in the telecommunications market, in e-commerce, 
and in environmental economics (see, e.g., the surveys provided by Roth, 2002, Sturm and 
Weimann, 2006, which deal with selective topics of this research). 
With the growing use of experiments in all three fields of application, experimental econo-
mists have become more and more interested in the fundamental question of how certain pa-
rameters of the experimental environment influence the subjects’ behavior. This part of expe-
rimental economics is still in its infancy and covers analyses of possible behavioral effects 
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caused by e.g., the magnitude of incentives, the presentation of the experimental task, or the 
composition of the subject pool. Analyzing the influence of the experimental environment is 
an important methodological issue for experimental research since experiments that are de-
signed to properly distinguish between different hypotheses have to control not only for the 
variables that are assumed to be relevant to these hypotheses, but for all parameters of the 
experimental design that might have an influence on behavior. Knowing these parameters and 
their effects on individual behavior, thus, is an essential prerequisite for choosing the appro-
priate experimental design. Moreover, since these variables might play an important role in 
subjects’ behavior in reality as well, evaluating their effects and implementing them under 
controlled conditions in the laboratory allows the gap between internal and external validity 
of experimental research to be closed.  
How do the experimental studies discussed in this paper relate to the four categories of expe-
rimental research? First, they test whether the observed effects of communication are in line 
with the theoretical predictions. Second, since it turns out that conventional theory cannot 
fully explain the observed influences of communication, the studies provide a basis for the 
development of new theories that are able to capture the reported results. Third, the experi-
ments give some hints about how and when communication facilities can be implemented in 
real economic environments. For example, they help to find out in what sense eBay might be 
right when stating that “Skype can increase the velocity of trade on eBay, especially in cate-
gories that require more involved communications such as used cars, business and industrial 
equipment, and high-end collectibles.”4 Last but not least, the observed effects of different 
communication opportunities are also important from a methodological point of view since 
they help to conduct economic experiments in a more controlled way. 
C.  Some experimental results on the communication effect 
As has been mentioned in the introduction, there exists a number of experimental studies on 
dilemma games demonstrating that pre-play communication can significantly enhance contri-
butions and, therefore, increase efficiency. From a game-theoretical point of view, however, 
pre-play communication in dilemma games is cheap talk and is not predicted to affect the 
subjects’ decisions. Because economic theory is not sufficiently advanced to provide an ex-
planation for the observed communication effects, systematic experimental investigations of 
different aspects of communication in different games and information environments can help 
to learn more about the underlying mechanics of the communication effect. The following 
paragraphs present some recent findings of experimental research on communication. 
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C.I. Which elements of face-to-face contact are essential for the communication effect? 
Given that most of the earlier experiments focused on face-to-face communication, it might 
be useful to explore in a first step which features of face-to-face communication are essential 
for the activation of cooperative behavior. 
Is it necessary that subjects see each other or is communication via an audio-conference 
enough to significantly increase cooperation rates? 
Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2003) investigated this question in a four-person public 
good game, which was repeated over ten rounds. In each of the ten rounds, every subject re-
ceived an endowment of DM 2.00 and had to decide how much of the endowment to keep for 
oneself and how much to contribute to the group. Each individual contribution xi yielded a 
payment of 0.5  xi for each of the four group members. Consequently, the payoff for each in-
dividual i per round was i = 2.00 – xi + 0.5  xi. According to the subgame perfect equili-
brium prediction, subjects should keep their entire endowment for themselves, although their 
group-payoff would be maximized if all of them give their entire endowment to the group.  
In order to separate the effects of visual and auditory communication they employed four 
treatments that only differed with regard to the communication opportunity. In their reference 
treatment, subjects played the repeated public good game without pre-play communication. In 
the identification treatment subjects could see their group members on a screen divided into 
four quads each showing another member. During the visual identification phase the signaling 
of game-relevant information was prohibited. In the audio-conference treatment subjects 
could talk to their group members via microphone and headphone for a maximum of ten mi-
nutes, but could not see each other. In the face-to-face treatment subjects were seated around a 
table where they could talk with each other for a maximum of ten minutes. Each of the treat-
ments was played with five groups. The results are illustrated in Figure 1. 
In line with previous research on public good games, subjects’ average contribution without 
pre-play communication was about 48 percent of the total endowment. Interestingly, introduc-
ing pure visual identification did not significantly change this result (p > 0.309, two-tailed 
exact Mann-Whitney-U test5).6 On average, subjects still contributed about 42 percent of their 
endowment. In contrast, giving subjects the opportunity to talk to their group members via an 
audio-conference significantly increased average cooperation rates in the first round (p = 
0.024, two-tailed exact MWU test). But the cooperation-enhancing effect was not stable and 
subjects’ average contributions soon reached the level observed in the reference and in the 
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identification treatment. Only when subjects communicated face-to-face and, therefore, used 
both the auditory and the visual communication channel nearly efficient and stable coopera-
tion was reached. 
Figure 1. Average contributions in reference, identification, audio, and face-to-face. 
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(Data source: Brosig, Ockenfels, Weimann, 2003) 
How do passive communication channels perform compared to active face-to-face contact? 
Communication in large groups is frequently executed via passive communication channels, 
i.e. subjects are exposed to the communication of others and cannot intervene. Given that, in 
reality, many public goods have to be provided in large groups (e.g., environmental goods 
such as clean air) it is important to know whether this form of communication can substitute 
the active face-to-face contact. Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2003) employed two addi-
tional treatments that provide passive communication technologies that are typically used by 
mass media: talk-show and lecture. In order to secure the comparability of passive and active 
communication channels, the observations were based on the same group size of four in all 
treatments. In the talk-show treatment, subjects were shown the video-taped discussion of 
another group of subjects. In this group subjects computed the payoff consequences resulting 
from various contribution decisions and pointed out the conflict between individual and group 
rationality. At the end of their discussion, all subjects agreed to cooperate conditioned on not 
being exploited.7 In the lecture treatment subjects saw a video-lecture given by a faculty 
member who was not involved in the experiments. The lecturer explained the public good 
game, characterized both the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game and the outcome that 
maximizes the group payoff and described experimental finding revealing that face-to-face 
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communication has a substantial effect on cooperation rates. All subjects in either treatment 
saw the same video. Figure 2 illustrates the findings made in the two treatments. 
Figure 2. Average contributions in reference, talk-show, lecture, and face-to-face. 
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(Data source: Brosig, Ockenfels, Weimann, 2003) 
In the first rounds, the two passive forms of communication resulted in somewhat higher con-
tribution levels compared to the reference treatment (talk-show: p = 0.032 in round 1, lecture: 
p = 0.087 in round 2), though even in these two rounds the levels were significantly lower 
than the ones realized after face-to-face contact (p < 0.049, two-tailed exact MWU test). As 
observed with auditory communication, cooperation was not stable and broke down soon the-
reafter. In fact, the three treatments (audio-conference, lecture, and talk-show) did not signifi-
cantly differ regarding the observed effects on individual behavior (p > 0.221, two-tailed exact 
MWU test). The finding that passive communication technologies are not as effective as ac-
tive face-to-face communication raises rather little hope that these technologies can be used to 
effectively increase public good contributions in large groups. 
Can the use of online-media such as video-conferences and email messages substitute direct 
face-to-face contacts? 
Video-conferences and email chats are frequently implemented in economically relevant on-
line interactions. But does communication that is based on electronic communication media 
reproduce the cooperation-enhancing effect of direct face-to-face communication? In their 
experiment, Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2003) analyzed a seventh treatment in which 
subjects communicated with each other via a video-conferencing system that combined the 
equipment used in the identification and in the audio-conference treatments. 
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Figure 3. Average contributions in reference, video-conference, and face-to-face. 
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(Data source: Brosig, Ockenfels, Weimann, 2003) 
In neither of the ten rounds, the average cooperation levels observed after video communica-
tion differed significantly from the average levels observed after face-to-face communication 
(p > 0.245, two-tailed exact MWU test). In both treatments subjects reached nearly full and 
stable cooperation levels. Apparently, communication via a video-conference has the same 
favorable features as direct face-to-face contact. What about email chats? 
Bochet, Page, and Putterman (2005) compared the effects of face-to-face communication with 
the exchange of text messages and the exchange of numerical messages in a repeated public 
good game. The game design was similar to that employed by Brosig, Ockenfels, and Wei-
mann (2003), i.e. games were played in groups of four and repeated over ten rounds. In their 
baseline treatment, subjects played the public good game without pre-play communication. In 
the chat room treatment, subjects were given the opportunity to exchange text messages with 
each other. In contrast to Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2003), subjects were not only 
allowed to communicate before the first round, but also before the fourth and the seventh 
round. In the numerical cheap talk treatment, each round consisted of two stages, the commu-
nication stage, in which subjects could exchange numbers representing possible contributions 
(to which they were not committed), and the decision stage, in which actual contributions 
were entered. In the face-to-face treatment subjects were allowed to see and talk to other 
group members for five minutes. Each treatment was played with at least 8 groups. Figure 4 
illustrates the average contributions observed in the four treatments. The dashed lines mark 
the communication stages which were implemented after the first round. 
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Figure 4. Average contributions in baseline, chat, numerical messages, and face-to-face. 
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(Data source: Bochet, Page, Putterman, 2005) 
Confirming previous observations, face-to-face communication resulted in nearly efficient 
cooperation rates while the baseline treatment produced an average contribution of about 48 
percent of the initial endowment. Similar to the audio-conference treatment employed by Bro-
sig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2003), the exchange of text messages seemed to increase con-
tributions, but only in rounds that immediately followed the communication stages. In total, 
the average contribution in the chat treatment was significantly higher than that in the baseline 
treatment (p < 0.050), but weakly significantly lower than that in the face-to-face communica-
tion treatment (p < 0.100, two-tailed MWU test). In contrast to text messages, the mere ex-
change of numerical messages did not affect the average level of contributions (p > 0.100, 
two-tailed MWU test).  
That email communication has a positive influence on cooperation (though, it is not as effec-
tive as face-to-face communication) was also observed in the public good game experiment 
conducted by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998). The experiment consisted of two consecu-
tive phases: In phase 1 subjects played seven rounds of a five-person public good game under 
either of three different pre-round communication opportunities: no communication, email 
communication, or face-to-face communication. In phase 2 subjects played another five 
rounds of this game without communication. Subjects were neither informed about the num-
ber of rounds that would be run in the two phases nor told that phase 2 would follow phase 1. 
All treatments were conducted with 5 to 6 groups. 
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Figure 5. Average contributions made in the first (left) and the second treatment (right). 
  
(Source: Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998, p. 398, 399) 
Face-to-face communication led to virtually complete cooperation in phase 1, while email 
communication was significantly less effective in this phase (p < 0.025, MWU test). Although 
subjects were allowed to communicate only in the first phase and did not know about the 
second, both forms of communication had a positive effect on the average contribution in 
phase 2 (p < 0.002, MWU test on the individual level). This lingering effect did, on average, 
not depend on whether subjects communicated face-to-face or via emails. 
In a second treatment, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) changed the incentives in a way that 
it was profitable for subjects to contribute their total endowment in each round. As a conse-
quence, they could no longer find a significant difference between the effects of the two 
communication media. This result suggests that the communication channel is less relevant 
when there is no conflict between the players’ interests. There was also no long-lasting effect 
of communication on cooperation in phase 2 (in which subjects played five rounds of the 
conventional public good game). Apparently, average contributions are not affected by com-
munication that is not directly related to the dilemma situation and that is conducted without 
knowledge about the future interaction. 
C.II. How do the observations obtained in public good experiments translate to 
bargaining games? 
The previous findings lead to the conclusion that new electronic communication technologies 
as video-conferences and email messages may have a good chance to (at least) partly substi-
tute conventional communication channels that require people to be near to each other in a 
physical sense. This is of particular importance for the design of economic institutions in on-
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line environments. In these environments – as also in many offline settings – economic agents 
often have an incentive to break agreements in order to receive additional individual gains. 
While there have evolved institutions to prevent such a defective behavior in offline interac-
tions (e.g., written contracts, commercial law, warranties), in online environments it is more 
difficult and costly for conventional institutions to prevent the interacting partners from defec-
tive behavior. In recent times, growing experimental and theoretical research has been de-
voted to the development of systems that can substitute for the conventional institutions in e-
commerce (see e.g., Dellarocas, 2003, Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels, 2004, 2005). Given the 
result that electronically mediated communication can enhance cooperative behavior, this 
form of communication might be used as an informal mechanism to increase the incentive to 
keep agreements and, therefore, to promote the efficiency of outcomes. But how do the ob-
servations obtained in public good games translate to bargaining settings, as they are more 
characteristic for many online environments? Particularly, given that online interactions often 
involve incomplete information between economic agents, there is the question on how the 
information structure interacts with the communication effect. 
How do conventional communication media perform in bargaining games? 
That conventional face-to-face communication can also affect bargaining outcomes was sug-
gested by, e.g., Radner and Schotter (1989) and Roth (1995). Radner and Schotter (1989) 
compared face-to-face bargaining with the sealed bid mechanism in a bilateral bargaining 
game with incomplete information. They observed that under all performance (efficiency) 
measures face-to-face bargaining “clearly out-performed the sealed-bid mechanism in all its 
variations tested” (p. 209). In Roth’s (1995) experiment, subjects played the ultimatum game 
introduced by Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982). In this game a fixed amount of 
money is divided between two players. The proposer suggests a division and the responder 
either accepts or rejects the offer. In the former case the pie is allocated as proposed while in 
the latter case both players receive nothing. Roth (1995) reports that pre-play face-to-face 
communication increased the average offer made by proposers (42.7 percent vs. 48.5 percent) 
and, thus, decreased the frequency of disagreements (33 percent vs. 4 percent). Restricting the 
content of communication to game-irrelevant talk did not much change these results. Though, 
in contrast to unrestricted communication, the percentage of equal split offers did not increase 
after game-irrelevant talk (no communication: 31 percent, unrestricted communication: 75 
percent, restricted communication: 39 percent).8 
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The effects of different pre-play communication opportunities (written, phone, face-to-face) 
on bilateral bargaining were analyzed by Valley, Moag, and Bazerman (1998, study 2). They 
employed a version of the “Acquire-a-Company” game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), 
in which two players bargain over the price of a company. The seller knows its value which is 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between $0 and $100. The buyer knows that the 
company is worth 1.5 times as much to him as it is to the seller. In the written communication 
treatment subjects could write notes, which were carried back and forth between bargaining 
partners, in the phone communication treatment subjects could talk to their partners via a tel-
ephone, and in the face-to-face communication treatment bargaining partners were send to 
separate areas where they could negotiate with each other. In all treatments, the content of 
communication was not restricted and communication lasted for about 20 minutes except for 
the written treatment, where subjects were given 30 minutes. The results demonstrate that 
face-to-face contact lead to significantly more mutually beneficial agreements (12 vs. 6, 2 = 
6.14, p < 0.01) and significantly less impasses than written communication (4 vs. 14, 2 = 
5.42, p < 0.05). Bargaining via telephone also significantly reduced the rate of impasses com-
pared to written communication (3 vs. 14, 2 = 7.29, p < 0.01). In all three communication 
treatments, joint gains were significantly higher than theoretically predicted (face-to-face: t(20) 
= 5.76, p < 0.0001, phone: t(20) = 5.25, p < 0.0001, written: t(26) = 3.61, p < 0.001) and did not 
significantly differ between the treatments (F(2,66) = 2.09, p = 0.13). 
The effects of written and face-to-face communication compared to no communication were 
investigated by Valley, Thompson, Gibbons, and Bazerman (2002). Their experiment was 
based on a bilateral bargaining game similar to that used by Radner and Schotter (1989). In 
this game, a buyer and a seller were each given a randomly and independently drawn valua-
tion for a hypothetical good. The buyer and the seller each named a price at which they were 
willing to transact. If the buyer’s bid was greater than what the seller’s asked for, the good 
was traded at the average of their two prices. If not, no trade occurred. In the no communica-
tion treatment subjects played the game without pre-play communication, in the written 
communication treatment subjects could exchange written messages for 13 minutes, and in 
the face-to-face treatment they were allowed to meet and talk for 6 minutes in separate rooms. 
In neither of the treatments the content of communication was restricted. Figure 6 illustrates 
the trade outcomes and includes the 45-degree line, on which the buyer’s valuation vb and the 
seller’s valuation vs are equal, and a second line, below which the Chatterjee-Samuelson li-
near equilibrium predicts that no trade will occur (vb = vs + 12.5). 
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Figure 6. Trade outcomes after no, written, and face-to-face communication. 
 
(Source: Valley, Thompson, Gibbons and Bazerman, 2002, p. 138) 
Valley, Thompson, Gibbons, and Bazerman (2002) observed that without communication 89 
percent of the high value trades (vb > vs + 12.5) were realized, but only 11 percent of the low 
value trades (vs < vb < vs + 12.5). With written communication a somewhat lower fraction of 
high value trades was achieved (82.3 percent), but a much higher fraction of low value trades 
(44 percent). Face-to-face communication was even more effective and resulted in significant-
ly more high value and low value trades (94 percent and 74 percent).9 The increase of trades 
after communication was attained by using two coordination strategies: agreement on a single 
price and mutual revelation of values. Since coordination in the face-to-face treatment was 
less compromised by deception, however, there were more mutually beneficent trades in this 
treatment than after written communication. 
How do online-media such as video-conferences and emails affect bargaining outcomes? 
While previous studies on bargaining games focused on conventional communication media 
as written messages and face-to-face contacts, Brosig, Weimann, and Yang (2004) directly 
tested the effects of online communication technologies on bargaining outcomes. In their 
study subjects played a one-shot bilateral bargaining game in which the first mover had to 
choose between the two options A and B and, informed about the first mover’s decision, the 
second mover determined the final outcome of the game by deciding for either option 1 or 
option 2. The payoffs were chosen in a way that the first mover favors the subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome in subgame B (B2) and the second mover prefers the (not perfect) Nash 
equilibrium in the subgame A (A1). There were two sanctioning means implemented in the 
payoff structure of this game: If the first mover decided for the subgame perfect equilibrium 
action B, the second mover had the opportunity to punish him, i.e. reduce his payoff by 
choosing the off-equilibrium action 1. If the first mover chose to deviate from the subgame 
perfect equilibrium, the second mover could reward him, i.e. increase his payoff by deciding 
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for the off-equilibrium action 2. The game was played under three communication conditions: 
no communication, email communication, and video communication. In the no communica-
tion treatment subjects played the game without any form of pre-play communication, in the 
email treatment, subjects could exchange email messages for a maximum of 15 minutes via 
the computer, and in the video treatment subjects communicated by the use of a video-
conferencing system. 
The specific game design allowed to test an additional feature of the communication effect: 
As observed in previous experimental studies subjects use communication for coordinating 
their behavior. The analysis of the content of communication in the public good experiment 
conducted by Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2003) particularly showed that “The use of 
promises together with threats in the communication phase apparently serves to coordinate 
the attempt to reach persistent cooperation.” (p. 22). This finding suggests that the opportuni-
ty to sanction behavior plays an important role for coordination and, therefore, for the com-
munication effect. But how does the effectiveness of the subjects’ sanctioning means interact 
with the communication effect? In order to investigate this question Brosig, Weimann, and 
Yang (2004) played three versions of the bargaining game varying the effectiveness of sanc-
tioning means, which is according to the heuristic developed by Mitropoulos, Weimann, and 
Yang (2001) determined by two parameters: the efficiency of the second mover’s punishment 
(PunEff) and the first mover’s maxmin loss of choosing B instead of A (MxCost).10 
Figure 7. The three sequential bargaining games varying MxCost and PunEff. 
 
The observations made in the treatment without communication were fully in line with the 
predictions made by Mitropoulos, Weimann, and Yang (2001). While reducing PunEff from 
game H (PunEff = 7) to game M (PunEff = 2) lead to significantly less punishment by second 
movers in the B-subgame (p = 0.001), reducing MxCost from game M (MxCost = 8) to game 
L (MxCost = 1) lead to a significant increase of the number of first movers choosing B in-
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stead of A (p = 0.021, two-tailed 2 test). Figure 8 presents the bargaining outcomes observed 
after no communication, after video communication, and after email communication. Prop(A) 
denotes the proportion of first movers choosing option A, prop(2|A) denotes the proportion of 
second movers responding with option 2 to the first mover’s A-move, and p(1|B) denotes the 
proportion of second movers responding with option 1 to the first mover’s B-move. 
Figure 8. Bargaining outcomes after no, video, and email communication. 
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(Data source: Brosig, Weimann, and Yang, 2004) 
Playing the three games after video communication significantly increased the number of first 
movers deciding for A and significantly decreased the number of second movers exploiting 
this move by choosing 1 (p < 0.001 for all games, two-tailed 2 test). Although subjects expli-
citly referred to their sanctioning opportunities in the discussions, neither the number of pairs 
who agreed on the equal split outcome A2 (game H: 81%, game M: 71%, game L: 86%) nor 
the number of pairs in which this agreement was successfully realized (game H: 100%, game 
M: 77%, game L: 84%) was significantly affected by PunEff and MaxCost. Only in those 
pairs who could not reach an agreement, the effectiveness of sanctioning means influenced 
bargaining outcomes. Introducing email communication in games H and M had a similar ef-
fect on behavior. There were significantly more first movers choosing A and significantly 
more second movers rewarding this move by deciding for option 2 than without communica-
tion (p < 0.005 for all games, two-tailed 2 test). Although, the behavioral changes after email 
communication were weaker than those observed after video communication (first mover: p = 
0.023 in game H, second mover: p< 0.027 in games H and M, two-tailed 2 test).11 
Thus, similar to conventional communication media, online-communication opportunities as 
face-to-face contact via video-conferences and the exchange of written messages via emails 
significantly affect bargaining outcomes. Though, in line with the observations made in public 
good games, email communication is somewhat less effective than video communication.  
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Is the influence of communication due to reputation effects? 
One possible explanation for the dramatic change of behavior after pre-play communication 
are reputation effects, i.e. effects that are due to the possibility that subjects might meet again 
outside the laboratory. Even in previous studies using e-mail or written communication, sub-
jects either could see the other participants during the sessions, or had contact with them be-
fore or after the experiment, or were not restricted in the content of communication, i.e. were 
allowed to reveal their own identity. The email communication treatment implemented by 
Brosig, Weimann, and Yang (2004) was designed to control for such reputation effects. They 
did not only prohibit subjects to give any private information that could reveal their identity 
(e.g., names, addresses, phone numbers, field of study), but tried also to ensure that subjects 
were not acquainted with their partner and had no contact with him either before or after the 
experiment. Therefore, in addition to their registration, subjects had to sign a form, stating 
that they would inform the experimenter if they noticed that an acquaintance would be taking 
part at the same session. For the experiment, each subject was assigned to another room. Hav-
ing arrived in their rooms, subjects were led one after another to their (sound-proof) cabins, 
where they had to stay for the whole experiment. After the experiment, subjects were paid off 
one after another and left the cabins and the room separately. 
As reported above, even the exchange of anonymous email messages significantly changed 
the subjects’ behavior (though, not as much as video communication). This indicates that the 
effect of communication can only to a minor degree be attributed to reputation effects. This is 
good news for online environments since it implies that even the anonymous exchange of 
messages can ease the realization of mutually beneficent bargaining outcomes.  
How do different information structures influence behavior after communication? 
Although there are experiments that investigate the influence of communication in bargaining 
games with one-sided incomplete information (see Valley, Moag, and Bazerman, 1998), and 
with two-sided incomplete information (see Radner and Schotter, 1989 and Valley, Thomp-
son, Gibbons, and Bazerman, 2002), none of these studies directly compared the communica-
tion effect between the two information environments. Given that many online interactions 
involve some form of incomplete information, it is important to know, however, how the ef-
fects of communication interact with the specific information structure involved in the bar-
gaining process. Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2002) analyzed electronic bargaining with 
incomplete information varying the information about buyer characteristics available to the 
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seller (symmetric and asymmetric)12 and the communication medium available to the bargain-
ing partners (none, email, and video-conference). Their experiment was based on a sequential 
bilateral bargaining game which was played over two rounds. On the first stage of this game, 
the seller submitted an ask for a hypothetical good and the buyer, informed about this ask, 
submitted a bid on the second stage. If the buyer’s bid exceeded the seller’s ask, the good was 
traded for a price, which was halfway between the two. If not, no trade occurred. In order to 
determine the buyer’s and the seller’s valuation, two numbers were randomly and indepen-
dently drawn from a uniform distribution [0, 100]. The lower number was the seller’s cost and 
the higher number was the buyer’s reservation value. This procedure ensured that the gain 
from trade was never negative. To facilitate statistical analyses and to make the data across 
treatments straightforwardly comparable, the same costs and reservation values were used in 
all sessions and treatments. 
In the symmetric information treatment, the seller’s cost and the buyer’s reservation value 
were private information, while in the asymmetric information condition, only the cost value 
was private information, i.e., the seller was informed about both, his costs and the buyer’s 
reservation value. In the two communication treatments, subjects could make proposals re-
garding their bids, but they were not permitted to reveal any personal information like their 
names and phone numbers. In the email treatment, subjects were allowed to exchange email 
messages for a maximum of 15 minutes via the computer and in the video treatment subjects 
were allowed to communicate for a maximum of 10 minutes via a video-conference.  
Figure 9. Sellers’ profit share realized after no, email, and video communication. 
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(Data source: Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann, 2002) 
In both information treatments, introducing pre-play communication lead sellers to submit 
significantly lower asks than without communication (p < 0.018, two-tailed MWU test). In 
particular, after communication there were significantly more buyers and significantly more 
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sellers who wanted to realize the equal split than in the treatments without communication (p 
< 0.018, two-tailed 2 test). As a consequence, sellers’ (buyers’) profits tended to decrease 
(increase) with communication (p < 0.024 with asymmetric information, two-tailed MWU 
test).13 In contrast to the previous study, Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2002) did not ob-
serve significant differences between the effects resulting from email and video communica-
tion (p > 0.341, two-tailed MWU test and two-tailed 2 test).  
In line with economic theory, giving sellers additional information about the buyer’s reserva-
tion value significantly increased their average share of the total gain from trade. This was not 
only true without communication, but was also observed after pre-play communication (p < 
0.016, two-tailed MWU test). As theoretically predicted, there was no significant difference in 
buyers’ behavior across the two information treatments. 
Is one-way communication as effective as two-way communication? 
Interactions in online environments often involve some form of one-way communication, i.e. 
only the sellers can send messages. Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2002) employed two 
additional treatments with one-way communication (email and video) in their study in order 
to test whether the direction of communication has any effect on bargaining behavior.14 In the 
two one-way communication treatments, only the seller was allowed to communicate. His 
message was transferred to the buyer together with the decision formula filled in with the sel-
ler’s ask. Similar to the two-way communication treatments, the seller could use the message 
to make proposals regarding the buyer’s bid, but was not permitted to reveal any personal 
information. While the email message transferred to the buyer was restricted to 20 lines on the 
computer screen, the video message could not exceed 5 minutes.  
Figure 10. Sellers’ profit share realized after no, one-way, and two-way communication. 
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(Data source: Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann, 2002) 
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While uninformed sellers submitted significantly lower asks with both, one-way and two-way 
communication, informed sellers significantly reduced their asks only with two-way commu-
nication (p < 0.018, two-tailed MWU test). That is, one-way communication did not signifi-
cantly affect the informed sellers’ behavior. Similar to two-way communication, one-way 
communication resulted in significantly lower (higher) profit shares for sellers (buyers) (p < 
0.041, two-tailed MWU test). This was true for both information treatments, though with 
asymmetric information the effect of one-way communication was somewhat weaker than the 
effect of two-way communication (p < 0.090, two-tailed MWU test). The medium used for 
one-way communication (email vs. video-conference) had no additional effect on behavior. 
The previous findings demonstrate that even one-way communication can significantly de-
crease the sellers’ profit shares and, therefore, reduce the inequality between the buyers’ and 
the sellers’ profits (which was particularly observable in the treatments with informed sellers). 
Although, one-way communication was somewhat less effective in this respect than two-way 
communication. Schmidt and Zultan (2004) report similar findings regarding the direction of 
communication. In their study on the ultimatum game they particularly investigated the effect 
of one-way communication that was restricted to game-irrelevant talk. In total, they employed 
five treatments: one without pre-play communication, two with restricted one-way video 
communication (proposer talks, responder talks), and two with two-way video communication 
(restricted, unrestricted). In the one-way communication treatments, either the proposer or the 
responder could send a video message to the partner which was restricted to two minutes. 
Figure 11. Behavior observed after no, one-way, and two-way communication. 
34.5%
39.5% 40.3%
45.1% 46.7%
without one-sided
restricted
(proposer)
one-sided
restricted
(responder)
two-sided
restricted
two-sided
unrestricted
average offers
34.0%
54.0% 58.0%
81.0% 78.0%
without one-sided
restricted
(proposer)
one-sided
restricted
(responder)
two-sided
restricted
two-sided
unrestricted
nearly equal split offers
 
(Data source: Schmidt and Zultan, 2004) 
Schmidt and Zultan (2004) could qualitatively replicate the results reported by Roth (1995): 
Both forms of two-way video communication increased average offers and decreased the fre-
quency of disagreements.15 Introducing restricted one-way communication had rather little 
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effects on behavior, however. This was not only true with regard to average offers, but also 
with regard to the percentage of (nearly) equal split offers (proposer talks: p < 0.100, res-
ponder talks: p < 0.050, one-tailed MWU and 2 tests). 
D.  Conclusions 
What can we learn from these experiments? First of all, cheap talk matters. Even in its most 
restricted and anonymous forms, communication can significantly affect behavior in various 
game and information settings. Allowing subjects to actively and unrestrictedly communicate 
with each other using both the visual and the auditory communication channel has the strong-
est effect on decisions, however. What does theory say regarding the observed effects of 
communication? Until now, not much. Although there exist game-theoretic models that can 
capture some effects of cheap talk communication in coordination and coordination-like types 
of games, in interactions that include strong incentives to lie, the predicted impact of cheap 
talk is very limited (see the reviews by Farrell and Rabin, 1996 and Crawford, 1998). Given 
that communication is a fundamental element of many economically relevant interactions in 
the real world, economic theory is quite silent about an important part of real-world economic 
environments. Further research is needed in order to develop new theories that can capture the 
behavioral effects of communication. The studies presented in this paper were dedicated to 
provide a first basis for the development of such new theories, but might also stimulate future 
experimental research on this topic. 
Finally, let’s come back to the example mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Is eBay 
right when arguing that implementing the online communication facilities provided by Skype 
helps to increase the number of trades? According to the experimental findings reported in 
this paper, the exchange of emails and, even more, face-to-face communication via video-
conferences support the coordination of behavior and, thus, can raise the number of mutually 
beneficent outcomes. This is also true for environments that include some form of incomplete 
information as it is characteristic for online platforms like eBay. Moreover, since in online 
environments it is less costly for economic agents to break the agreed terms of trade, e.g., to 
send goods in a lower than the agreed quality, the implementation of online communication 
channels as informal reputation mechanisms can help to increase the incentive to keep agree-
ments and, therefore, promote the efficiency of trade. Particularly in transactions where the 
quality of the traded goods is quite difficult to observe (e.g., used cars, high-end collectibles), 
communication might, thus, become an central instrument to facilitate trade in e-commerce. 
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Notes 
 
1 BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/4237338.stm, 2005/09/12. 
2 Other examples include the studies conducted by Radlow and Weidner (1966), Jerdee and Rosen (1974), and 
Caldwell (1976). 
3 Similar results on the effect of face-to-face communication were reported in economic experiments on common 
pool resource games (e.g., Ostrom and Walker, 1991, Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994, Hackett, Schlager, 
and Walker, 1994). 
4 BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/4237338.stm, 2005/09/12. 
5 The Mann-Whitney-U test is in the following abbreviated as MWU test. 
6 This finding seems to be in contrast to the so-called ‘social distance’ hypothesis formulated by Hoffman, 
McCabe, Smith (1996, 1999) and Bohnet and Frey (1999a, b). According to this hypothesis visual identification 
reduces the ‚social distance’ between subjects and, thus, helps to induce other-regarding behavior. 
7 Note that the discussion patterns were typical for subjects’ active communication. 
8 However, when including offers around the equal split, restricted communication seemed to be as effective as 
unrestricted communication. See also Schmidt and Zultan (2005), who re-examined Roth’s (1995) experiment 
with regard to responder behavior. 
9 Since the results regarding trade outcomes could be confounded by differences in the gains from trade across 
treatments, Valley, Thompson, Gibbons, and Bazerman (2002) ran logistic regressions on the 192 observations 
with positive gains from trade. According to their results, the coefficient on face-to-face communication was 
significantly positive and the coefficient on written communication was weakly significantly positive. 
10 Let i(x) denote the payoff to player i if outcome x is realized with i = first mover (FM), second mover (SM). 
The two parameters are then defined as PunEff = [FM(B2) - FM(B1)] / [SM(B2) - SM(B1)] and MxCost = 
[FM(A1) - FM(B1)]. 
11 There were no significant differences between email and video communication regarding the proportion of 
second movers who punished the first mover’s B-move (game H: 5/7 vs. 0/1, game M: 1/3 vs. 1/5). 
12 In the internet, information about consumer characteristics can easily be gathered and mined, while it is often 
more difficult for buyers to obtain similar information about sellers’ cost. For example, in 2000 online-retailer 
Amazon charged different customers different prices for the same item. While the company insisted that the 
price differentials were random in order to determine “the right balance between how much Amazon could 
charge and still maintain a good sales volume” (USA Today 09/29/00) many customers accused Amazon of 
basing their prices on billing information and purchasing history obtained by earlier software interaction. 
13 Note that communication did not significantly affect the buyers’ rejection behavior. 
14 While such effects were not explored in previous research on bargaining games, studies on coordination games 
suggest that the direction of communication can have a significant influence on behavior (e.g., Cooper, DeJong, 
Forsythe, and Roth, 1989, 1992). 
15 Asking responders to condition their decision to all feasible offers that the proposer could choose, Schmidt and 
Zultan (2004) additionally observed that they were willing to reject higher offers with unrestricted two-way 
communication and to reject lower offers with restricted two-way communication compared to the treatment 
without communication.  
